As a leading member of the Vienna Circle, Rudolph Carnap's aim was to bring about a "unified science" by applying a method of logical analysis to the empirical data of all the sciences. This work, first published in English in 1934, endeavors to work out a way in which the observation statements required for verification are not private to the observer. The work shows the strong influence of Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege.

A number of studies have shown reduced recall of specific autobiographical memories (AMs) in patients after attempted suicide, but in all of them the study samples were confounded with diagnoses of affective disorders. The present study aims to demonstrate impaired specific autobiographical memory in patients after a suicide attempt without a diagnosis of an affective disorder. Four groups were compared: (1) patients with an actual major depression and a suicide attempt; (2) patients after a suicide attempt without a lifetime history (...) of an affective diagnosis; (3) patients currently suffering from major depression without a suicide attempt; and (4) control persons not suffering from either of the two conditions during their entire life. Individuals with major depression and a suicide attempt showed reduced specificity of AM and, most importantly, patients with a suicide attempt—despite the absence of an affective disorder—were equally impaired with recall of specific AMs as were patients with major depression. The authors propose that reduced specific AM is a common vulnerability factor that can lead either to the development of an affective disorder and/or to a suicide attempt. (shrink)

Am 26. Juni 1956 wiederholte sich zum hundertsten Male der Todestag Max Stirners. Durch das Erscheinen seines Werkes "Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum", in dem er seine Zeit, die nachhegelianische Epoche, schonungslos kritisierte, war er bei den einen berühmt, bei anderen berüchtigt geworden. In neuerer Zeit lenkte er die allgemeine Aufmerksamkeit vor allem durch Nietzsche und durch die posthum erschienene Kritik Marxens an seinem Werk wieder auf sich, die letzterer 1845/46 gemeinsam mit Engels verfaßte, der Zeitumstände wegen aber "der nagenden (...) Kritik der Mäuse überlassen" mußte. Sie erschien erstmals unter dem Titel "Die deutsche Ideologie" in der Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, 1932, I. Abt., 5. Band. (shrink)

In the early days of the semantics for modal logic the `possible worlds' were thought of as models or interpretations. This was particularly so when the interpretation was of emph{logical} necessity or possibility, where this was understood in terms of validity. Arnould Bayart in 1958 may have been the first modal logician to argue explicitly against the identification of necessity and validity. This note contrasts his semantics with that provided by Rudolf Carnap in 1946, and examines Bayart's proof that (...) if you identify necessity with validity then certain theorems of S5 are not valid. The proof is then examined using Carnap's semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:142 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Das literarische und kiinstlerische Werk. By Rudolf Steiner. Eine bibliographische Uebersicht, 1961. (Dornaeh: 1961. Pp. 277.) This is a complete list of the writings, lectures, and artistic creations of the founder of Anthroposophy, Dr. Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925). It is, in addition, a description of the Temple of Anthroposophy, the "Goetheanum" in Dornach built after the ideas of Steiner, of his "mystery-plays," of his (...) ideas on "eurhythmy," of his designs of furnishings for the "Goetheanum," of his sculptural suggestions, etc. Thus, the booklet encompasses the whole life-work of Steiner and was published in 1961 at the 100th anniversary of his birth. It is prefaced by a biographical sketch based on Steiner's "Autobiography." Rudolf Steiner was the son of a railway employer from Lower Austria. He studied first in technical high schools (Realschule) in the neighborhood of the Austrian capital and then in the Technical University of u In the high school, he was already most impressed by the study of geometry and arithmetic because they seemed to show that there is an independent realm of thought not connected with the world of senses. This conviction led him to a lifelong search for a spiritual world beyond and above the visible world. While this impulse was rather scientific than religious, it led him also into the theosophical movement, then headed by Mrs. Annie Besant in London. But this connection was broken when Mrs. Besant wanted to appoint a young Hindu to be a reincarnation of Christ. This was unacceptable to Steiner and he founded the independent anthroposophical movement in Germany where he spent most of his life writing, teaching, and lecturing. His first writings were commentaries to the work~ of Goethe oa natural sciences. Goethe thus became the "heros eponymus" of Anthroposophy. In 1913, Steiner started to build the Temple of Anthroposophy at Dornaeh (Switzerland) which he called "Goetheanum." This temple, the details of the structure, its style, its furniture were supposed to be symbolical of.the ideas contained in Anthroposophy. In a cycle of lectures entitled "What was the purpose of the Goetheanum?" and "What is the purpose of Anthroposophy?" he states that this aim was the "exaltation of the human cognitive power into imagination, inspiration, and intuition." The results of this exaltation were a somewhat complicated and phantastic mysticism. The Goetheanum, which, for symbolical reasons, was built of wood, burned to the ground in 1922. Starting in 1924, it was replaced by a building in concrete. Steiner did not live to see the reconstructed Temple because he died in 1925. Steiner tried to invent new forms of art in his Goetheanum, new forms of dramatic poetry in his mystery-plays, and new forms of a spiritualized symbolic dance in his "eurhythmy." His life-work is prodigious. Apart from his writings he gave some 6,000 lectures. MAx RIESER New York City Gegenw~rtiges und Vergangenes im Menschengeiste. By Rudolf Steiner. (Dornach: 1962. Pp. 308.) This is a new printing in the framework of the Collected Works of Rudolf Steiner of twelve lectures given during World War I in Berlin in 1916. These lectures are historically interesting since they refer to contemporary publications in Germany and Austria, but they also offer in nuce the main elements of "Anthroposophy" in the form of an anthroposophical anthropology and also of an anthroposophical philosophy of cosmic and human history. The whole is based on the assumption of the existence of a spiritual world paralleling the physical world. This anthropology is aimed at the refutation of the materialistic conceptions based on the natural sciences of that time. Steiner thinks that a man built according to the ideas of the natural sciences would not be a living being but a sort of "homunculus," i.e., an automaton. Apart from the physical body, man has an "ethereal body," an "astral body," and an "Ego." These three entities do not die a physical death. In addition they represent the world of animals, of plants, and of minerals, respectively, incorporated in man. There are also different epochs of human development in which the relationship of the spiritual parts of the human being were not related to each other in the same... (shrink)

Alois Riehl’s View of Friedrich Nietzsche and His Relationship with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Alois Riehl and Friedrich Nietzsche were contemporaries – both were born in the same year, 1844. But the philosophical paths they followed could hardly be more different. Nevertheless, Riehl recognized Nietzsche as one of the most important thinkers of his time. He was one of the first academic philosophers to devote a detailed analysis to Nietzsche’s writings. And Riehl saw in Nietzsche’s work a complementary counterpart to the scientific (...) philosophy that he developed in his Philosophical Criticism. At the heart of the present paper is a speech given by Riehl on October 15, 1903, on the occasion of the reopening of the Villa Silberblick and the unveiling of Max Klinger’s bust of Nietzsche. The argument is divided into three parts. First, it reconstructs the background to these events historically in light of the friendly relationship between Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Riehl, as well as Riehl’s hesitation to give a speech. Second, Riehl’s ambivalent attitude in his reception of Nietzsche is analyzed through a close reading of his text. Third, the paper concludes with a final look at the specific event of October 15, 1903, based on historical material. (shrink)

What does syndicalism want? was first published in 1909, when the syndicalist revolt was growing worldwide. Baginski is clear in his call for working class rebellion: the task is not to fight simply for better conditions but ‘to break the chains of wage labor and at the same time the shackles of servitude to the state.’ At the same time, Baginski is no joyless martyr to ‘the cause’: personal freedom joins collective struggle at the core of his anarchism. Max Baginski (...) (1864-1943) was a German-born American anarchist activist and writer. Rudolf Rocker called him “one of the most outstanding human beings I have met in my life”. Nathan Jun’s introduction puts Baginski in his political and intellectual context as writer and anarchist. (shrink)

Interest in the metaphysics and logic of possible worlds goes back at least as far as Aristotle, but few books address the history of these important concepts. This volume offers new essays on the theories about the logical modalities held by leading philosophers from Aristotle in ancient Greece to Rudolf Carnap in the twentieth century. The story begins with an illuminating discussion of Aristotle's views on the connection between logic and metaphysics, continues through the Stoic and mediaeval traditions, and (...) then moves to the early modern period with particular attention to Locke and Leibniz. The views of Kant, Peirce, C. I. Lewis and Carnap complete the volume. Many of the essays illuminate the connection between the historical figures studied, and recent or current work in the philosophy of modality. The result is a rich and wide-ranging picture of the history of the logical modalities. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of (...) Europe. At the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

Most accounts of Weber’s notion of charisma follow his own explicit comments and seek its origins in the writings of Rudolf Sohm. While I acknowledge the validity of this, I follow Weber’s suggestions and locate the charismatic forces in the political and ethical conduct and beliefs of certain Old Testament prophets, specifically Amos, Jeremiah and Isaiah. Their emphasis on political justice and ethical fairness, coupled with their unwavering belief in the power of prophecy, infuse Weber’s conception of charisma and (...) in crucial ways contribute to the formation of his notion of the modern political leader. (shrink)

Max Scheler was a philosopher of intuition who rarely worked out his ideas systematically. Consequently, his philosophical writings present something of a challenge for the reader. There is little unifying his disparate studies. In this paper, I suggest that a distinction between life and spirit which Scheler formulated early and held onto throughout his career can provide a heuristic principle by which to study his works. This paper is a clarification of this distinction. In the first part of the paper, (...) I show that Scheler’s dualistic metaphysics has its roots in Rudolf Eucken’s idealistic philosophy. In the second and third parts of this essay, I clarify Scheler’s concept of spirit as he develops it in confrontation with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. Particularly, in the second part, I show that as he confronts Husserl’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science he postulates a radically different idea of the nature of philosophy, an idea that is rooted in this distinction between life and spirit. I explicate in the next section the unique theory of the phenomenological reduction Scheler develops on the basis of this distinction. In the last part, I briefly present how this conception of life and spirit are worked out in Scheler’s philosophical anthropology, particularly in his last work, The Human Place in the Cosmos. (shrink)

Max Scheler was a philosopher of intuition who rarely worked out his ideas systematically. Consequently, his philosophical writings present something of a challenge for the reader. There is little unifying his disparate studies. In this paper, I suggest that a distinction between life and spirit which Scheler formulated early and held onto throughout his career can provide a heuristic principle by which to study his works. This paper is a clarification of this distinction. In the first part of the paper, (...) I show that Scheler’s dualistic metaphysics has its roots in Rudolf Eucken’s idealistic philosophy. In the second and third parts of this essay, I clarify Scheler’s concept of spirit as he develops it in confrontation with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. Particularly, in the second part, I show that as he confronts Husserl’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science he postulates a radically different idea of the nature of philosophy, an idea that is rooted in this distinction between life and spirit. I explicate in the next section the unique theory of the phenomenological reduction Scheler develops on the basis of this distinction. In the last part, I briefly present how this conception of life and spirit are worked out in Scheler’s philosophical anthropology, particularly in his last work, The Human Place in the Cosmos. (shrink)

The book contains the proceedings of the conference 'A Clearing of the German Forest: Mysticism, Idealism and Romanticism' ("Eine Lichtung des deutschen Waldes: Mystik, Idealismus und Romantik") (May, 19-21, 2016, Dominican Convent, Erfurt), including contributions by some of the most important representatives in this field (Jens Halfwassen, Theo Kobusch, Johann Kreuzer, José, Sánchez de Murillo, Glenn A. Magee, Markus Vinzent, Rudolf K. Weigand, Christian Danz, Markus Enders, et al.). The volume presents articles concerning the relationship of Fichte, Hegel, Hölderlin (...) and Schelling with the most characteristic German mystics. The conference was organized in the context of the research project "A Historical, Philological and Systematic Study on Mystical Reason and its Reception in Schelling's Works," funded by the German Research Foundation. Der Band enthält die Akten der vom 19. bis 21. Mai im Kapitelsaal des Predigerklosters in Erfurt organisierten internationalen interdisziplinären Tagung "Eine Lichtung des deutschen Waldes: Mystik, Idealismus und Romantik", mit Beiträgen von einigen der wichtigsten Forscher in diesem Gebiet (Jens Halfwassen, Theo Kobusch, Johann Kreuzer, José Sánchez de Murillo, Glenn A. Magee, Markus Vinzent, Rudolf K. Weigand, Christian Danz, Markus Enders, usw.). Gesammelt werden in diesem Band die das Verhältnis von Fichte, Hegel, Hölderlin und Schelling zu den zentralen Autoren der deutschen Mystik betreffenden Aufsätze. Die Tagung fand im Kontext des von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft finanzierten Projekts 'Der ewige Begriff des Individuums': Eine historisch-philologische-systematische Untersuchung der mystischen Vernunft und deren Rezeption im Werk Schellings " statt. (shrink)

The book contains the proceedings of the conference 'A Clearing of the German Forest: Mysticism, Idealism and Romanticism' ("Eine Lichtung des deutschen Waldes: Mystik, Idealismus und Romantik") (May, 19-21, 2016, Dominican Convent, Erfurt), including contributions by some of the most important representatives in this field (Jens Halfwassen, Theo Kobusch, Johann Kreuzer, José, Sánchez de Murillo, Glenn A. Magee, Markus Vinzent, Rudolf K. Weigand, Christian Danz, Markus Enders, et al.). The volume presents articles concerning the relationship of Fichte, Hegel, Hölderlin (...) and Schelling with the most characteristic German mystics. The conference was organized in the context of the research project "A Historical, Philological and Systematic Study on Mystical Reason and its Reception in Schelling's Works," funded by the German Research Foundation. Der Band enthält die Akten der vom 19. bis 21. Mai im Kapitelsaal des Predigerklosters in Erfurt organisierten internationalen interdisziplinären Tagung "Eine Lichtung des deutschen Waldes: Mystik, Idealismus und Romantik", mit Beiträgen von einigen der wichtigsten Forscher in diesem Gebiet (Jens Halfwassen, Theo Kobusch, Johann Kreuzer, José Sánchez de Murillo, Glenn A. Magee, Markus Vinzent, Rudolf K. Weigand, Christian Danz, Markus Enders, usw.). Gesammelt werden in diesem Band die das Verhältnis von Fichte, Hegel, Hölderlin und Schelling zu den zentralen Autoren der deutschen Mystik betreffenden Aufsätze. Die Tagung fand im Kontext des von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft finanzierten Projekts 'Der ewige Begriff des Individuums': Eine historisch-philologische-systematische Untersuchung der mystischen Vernunft und deren Rezeption im Werk Schellings " statt. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger shared with Max Weber the decisionist understanding of values as something that cannot be justified by scientists or philosophers. Although both accepted the challenge of modernity in this respect, they reacted in opposite ways. Carnap, along with the Vienna Circle, defended a scientific conception of the world in which science and instrumental rationality were to permeate all of life; Heidegger embarked on an understanding of metaphysics in which rationality and science were to be eliminated. (...) Both strategies were deeply political, and both resulted from the split in the German youth and life-reform movement that took place during and immediately after World War I. I discuss this image here in the context of dialectical theology, the Vienna Circle, and the Davos Disputation, with a sideways glance at Ernst Cassirer, and with a view to earlier interpretations by Michael Friedman and Gottfried Gabriel. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger shared with Max Weber the decisionist understanding of values as something that cannot be justified by scientists or philosophers. Although both accepted the challenge of modernity in this respect, they reacted in opposite ways. Carnap, along with the Vienna Circle, defended a scientific conception of the world in which science and instrumental rationality were to permeate all of life; Heidegger embarked on an understanding of metaphysics in which rationality and science were to be eliminated. (...) Both strategies were deeply political, and both resulted from the split in the German youth and life reform movement that took place during and immediately after World War I. I discuss this image here in the context of dialectical theology, the Vienna Circle, and the Davos Disputation, with a sideways glance at Ernst Cassirer, and with a view to earlier interpretations by Michael Friedman and Gottfried Gabriel. (shrink)

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally (...) of American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart. (shrink)

Essays by Rudolf Bernoulli, Martin Buber, C. M. von Cammerloher, T. W. Danzel, Friedrich Heiler, C. G. Jung, C. Kerényi, John Layard, Fritz Meier, Max Pulver, Erwin Rousselle, and Heinrich Zimmer. With an introduction by Mircea Eliade.

Both Kant and Dilthey distinguish between cognition and knowledge, but they do so differently in accordance with their respective theoretical interests. Kant’s primary cognitive interest is in the natural sciences, and from this perspective the status of psychology is questioned because its phenomena are not mathematically measurable. Dilthey, by contrast, reconceives psychology as a human science.For Kant, knowledge is conceptual cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system. Dilthey also links knowledge with certainty; however, he derives (...) the latter from life-experience rather than from reason. Dilthey’s psychology begins with the self-certainty of lived experience and life-knowledge, but this turns out to fall short of cognitive understanding. In the final analysis, both Kant and Dilthey move beyond psychology to arrive at self-understanding. Because of his doubts about introspection, Kant replaces psychology with a pragmatic anthropology to provide a communal framework for self-understanding. Dilthey supplements psychology with other human sciences as part of a project of anthropological reflection.Author Keywords: Anthropology; Cognition; Dilthey; Kant; Knowledge; Psychology. (shrink)

The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...) This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science. (shrink)